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New York Times, Decemter 22, 2019, page 1.
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Fighting the Good Fight Against Online Child Sexual Abuse
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Several websites popular with sexual predators were thwarted last month
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after a determined campaign by groups dedicated to eliminating the
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content. It was a rare victory in an unending war.
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By GABRIEL J.X. DANCE DEC. 22, 2019
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In late November, the moderator of three highly trafficked websites posted
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a message titled "R.I.P." It offered a convoluted explanation for why they
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were left with no choice but to close.
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The unnamed moderator thanked over 100,000 "brothers" who had visited and
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contributed to the sites before their demise, blaming an "increasingly
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intolerant world" that did not allow children to "fully express
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themselves."
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In fact, forums on the sites had been bastions of illegal content almost
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since their inception in 2012, containing child sexual abuse photos and
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videos, including violent and explicit imagery of infants and toddlers.
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Exploited Articles in this series examine the explosion in online photos
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and videos of children being sexually abused. They include graphic
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descriptions of some instances of the abuse.
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The sites managed to survive so long because the internet provides
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enormous cover for sexual predators. Apps, social media platforms and
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video games are also riddled with illicit material, but they have
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corporate owners -- like Facebook and Microsoft -- that can monitor and
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remove it.
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In a world exploding with the imagery -- 45 million photos and videos of
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child sexual abuse were reported last year alone -- the open web is a
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freewheeling expanse where the underdog task of confronting the predators
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falls mainly to a few dozen nonprofits with small budgets and outsize
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determination.
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Several of those groups, including a child exploitation hotline in Canada,
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hunted the three sites across the internet for years but could never quite
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defeat them. The websites, records show, were led by an experienced
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computer programmer who was adept at staying one step ahead of his
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pursuers -- in particular, through the services of American and other tech
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companies with policies that can be used to shield criminal behavior.
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But the Canadian hotline developed a tech weapon of its own, a
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sophisticated tool to find and report illegal imagery on the web. When
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the sites found the tool directed at them, they fought back with a smear
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campaign, sending emails to the Canadian government and others with
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unfounded claims of "grave operational and financial corruption" against
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the nonprofit.
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It wasn't enough. The three sites were overwhelmed by the Canadian tool,
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which had sent more than 1 million notices of illegal content to the
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companies keeping them online. And last month, they were compelled to
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surrender.
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"It's been a wonderful 7 years and we would've loved to go for another 7,"
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the sites' moderator wrote in his final post, saying they had closed
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because "antis," short for "anti-pedophiles," were "hunting us to death
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with unprecedented zeal."
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The victory was cheered by groups fighting online child sexual abuse, but
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there were no illusions about the enormous undertaking that remained.
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Thousands of other sites offer anybody with a web browser access to
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illegal and depraved imagery of children, and unlike with apps, no special
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software or downloads are required.
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The three shuttered sites had hidden their tracks for years using the
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services of Cloudflare, an American firm that provides companies with
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cyberprotections. They also found a hosting company, Novogara, that gave
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them safe harbor in the Netherlands -- a small country with a robust web
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business and laws that are routinely exploited by bad actors.
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Cloudflare's general counsel said the company had cooperated with the
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nonprofits and law enforcement and cut ties with the sites seven times in
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all, as they slightly altered their web addresses to evade targeting. A
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spokesman for Novogara said the company had complied with Dutch law.
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Last year, Europe eclipsed the United States as the top hosting location
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for child abuse material on the open web, according to a report by Inhope,
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a group that coordinates child abuse hotlines around the world. Within
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Europe, the Netherlands led the list. To report online child sexual abuse
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or find resources for those in need of help, contact the National Center
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for Missing and Exploited Children at 1-800-843-5678.
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In an interview in The Hague, the Dutch minister of justice, Ferdinand
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Grapperhaus, said he was embarrassed by the role Dutch companies played.
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"I had not realized the extent of cruelty, and how far it goes," he said.
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When hotlines like the one in Canada learn about illegal imagery, they
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issue a takedown notice to the owner of the website and its hosting
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company. In most cases, the content is removed within hours or days from
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law-abiding sites. But because the notices are not legally binding, some
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owners and web hosts ignore or delay.
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Several Dutch hosting companies will not voluntarily remove such content,
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insisting that a judge decide whether it meets the legal definition of
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so-called child pornography. Even when they agree, abuse imagery reappears
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almost at once, setting the cycle back in motion.
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The Dutch police say they do not have the resources to play what is
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essentially an endless game of Whac-a-Mole with these companies, according
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to Arda Gerkens, a Dutch senator who leads Meldpunt Kinderporno, the Dutch
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child abuse hotline.
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"It takes a lot of time," Ms. Gerkens said, "and basically, they are
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swamped."
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That means results like last month's, while relished by hotlines around
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the world, are likely to remain rare.
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Our Little Community
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The trio of shuttered websites first emerged in early 2012, according to
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domain records and transcripts of online chats.
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Their professed goal was to offer an easily accessible digital space for
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pedophiles and sexual predators to indulge their twisted obsessions, which
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had often been shunned even on notorious websites like 4chan and 8chan.
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At least initially, the sites steered clear of imagery that was obviously
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illegal, the records show, focusing instead on photos and videos of young
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children posing in revealing clothing. Even so, the founder of the sites
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identified in the transcripts expressed surprise in 2014 that they had
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"lasted so long."
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But the Canadians were already on to them. By then, the small hotline had
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been alerted to dozens of illegal images on the websites.
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As the sites gained in popularity, child sexual abuse content became more
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and more common. The transcripts, which include over 10,000 time-stamped
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messages on a chat app, show how the founder, a man identifying himself as
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Avery Chicoine, reveled in the opportunity to interact with others who
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shared his interests.
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"What we got here," he wrote in 2015, "is our little community."
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By 2017, the sites' home pages featured images of young girls that did not
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legally qualify as child pornography in most countries but signaled that
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there was plenty available a click away. One of the girls, no older than
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7, lay on her back in sparse clothing with her legs spread; she had been a
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victim of sexual abuse, according to the Canadians, and was easily
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recognizable to predators through widely circulated imagery of the crimes.
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As illegal material flooded the sites, so did visitors. SimilarWeb, which
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measures internet traffic, estimated that the most popular of the sites
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received millions of visits a month earlier this year from an average of
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more than 500,000 unique visitors.
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The moderator of the sites in recent months boasted about the traffic in a
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series of emails and encrypted messages to The New York Times, attributing
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the popularity to the extreme content.
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The sites' many visitors were perhaps "the most hated people on earth," he
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said, describing them as belonging to an "oppressed sexual minority." He
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showed no remorse for their behavior, even casting the community of
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predators as visionaries whose crimes should be made legal.
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He did not identify himself and would not say if he was Mr. Chicoine -
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the sites' founder, according to the chat transcripts - or if he knew him.
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Last year, a Canadian by the name of Avery Chicoine with a lengthy
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criminal record was arrested in British Columbia and charged with
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possessing and distributing child pornography. The Canadian authorities
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would not say whether the charges related to the websites. According to
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court documents, he pleaded not guilty, and a trial is set for next month.
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He and his lawyer did not respond to requests for comment.
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The moderator would not address another pressing question: How had the
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sites managed to stay ahead of its pursuers so long?
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He said he did not want to hand a blueprint to his enemies, writing: "99%
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of attempts to bring us down fail. So I want the antis to keep wasting 99%
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of their time, instead of figuring out what works."
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In the chat transcripts, however, there were clues about the sites'
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evasion tactics. They pointed to a major cybersecurity firm, Cloudflare.
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A High-Tech Hideaway
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Based in San Francisco, Cloudflare built a billion-dollar business
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shielding websites from cyberattacks. One of its most popular services -
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used by 10 percent of the world's top sites, according to the company -
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can hide clients' internet addresses, making it difficult to identify the
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companies hosting them.
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The protections are valuable to many legitimate companies but can also be
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a boon to bad actors, though Cloudflare says it is not responsible for the
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content on its clients' sites. The man accused of a mass shooting at a
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Walmart in Texas had posted his manifesto on 8chan, an online message
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board that had been using Cloudflare's services and was well known for
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hosting hateful content. Cloudflare also came under criticism for
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providing services to the neo-Nazi site The Daily Stormer. (The company
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has since ended its relationship with both websites.)
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In the chat transcripts, the man identifying as Mr. Chicoine showed he was
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fully aware of the company's advantages when he signed on. "What
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cloudflare does is it masks and replaces your IP with one of theirs," he
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wrote in 2015, using the abbreviation for internet address.
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That year, he appeared to panic when a child abuse hotline identified one
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of his sites, telling a fellow moderator their operation was "finished."
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But when he later realized the hotline had sent the report to Cloudflare -
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and apparently not to the company that hosted the content - he seemed
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relieved. "Wait," he wrote, "may be ok."
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He was right.
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One month later, he expressed exasperation that a hotline had fired off
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another notice, this time to Cloudflare as well as the hosting company.
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The hotline confirmed the report with The Times. Still, the sites remained
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online.
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Interviews and records show that Cloudflare's services helped hold off the
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day of reckoning for Mr. Chicoine's sites by providing protections that
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forced hotlines to go to the company first.
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The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, the clearinghouse
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for abuse imagery in the United States, had sent Cloudflare notices about
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the sites starting in 2014, said John Shehan, a vice president at the
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center. Last year, it sent thousands.
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Even apart from the three sites, Mr. Shehan said, Cloudflare was well
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known to be used by those who post such content. So far this year, he
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said, the company had been named in 10 percent of reports about hosted
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child sexual abuse material. The center is in touch with Cloudflare "every
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day," Mr. Shehan said.
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Separately, records kept by the Canadian hotline, known as the Canadian
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Center for Child Protection, showed that since February 2017 there had
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been over 130,000 reports about 1,800 sites protected by Cloudflare.
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In December, the company was offering its services to 450 reported sites,
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according to records reviewed by The Times.
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Through its general counsel, Doug Kramer, Cloudflare said it worked
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closely with hotlines and law enforcement officials and responded promptly
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to their requests. It denied being responsible for the images, saying
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customer data was stored on its servers only briefly. Efforts to eliminate
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the content, the company said, should instead focus on the web-hosting
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companies.
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Records from the Canadian hotline revealed several cases in which abuse
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material stayed on Cloudflare's servers even after the host company
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removed it. In one instance, the imagery remained on Cloudflare for over a
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week afterward, allowing predators to continue viewing it.
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"The reality is that it is totally within Cloudflare<72>s power to remove
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child sexual abuse material that they have on their servers," said Lloyd
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Richardson, the technology director at the Canadian hotline.
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Records show that for several years, the sites were clients of Cloudflare,
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a U.S. tech company with servers in almost 200 cities in over 90 countries
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around the world that can be used to ward off cyberattacks.
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Cloudflare's protective services obscure a website's internet address.
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When you visit a protected site, you are actually communicating with a
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Cloudflare server located somewhere near you.
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Somebody visiting a protected site from Oklahoma, for example, may be
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directed to a Cloudflare server in Kansas City.
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That server will communicate with the website's server in turn, but only
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if it needs new information.
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Often, Cloudflare will already have the information requested in its
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systems.
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This means that images of abuse can remain on Cloudflare, even if they
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have been removed from the original host, according to records provided by
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a hotline in Canada.
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When asked why it did not cut ties with a number of companies known to
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host child sexual abuse imagery, Mr. Kramer said Cloudflare was not in the
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business of vetting customers' content. Doing so, he said, would have "a
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lot of implications" and is "something that we really have not
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entertained."
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Still, he said, the company had stopped providing services over the past
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eight years to more than 5,000 clients that had shared abuse material. And
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on Wednesday, the company announced a new product - currently in
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development - that would allow clients to scan their own sites.
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The tension over Cloudflare's protections reflects a larger debate about
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the balance between privacy on the internet and the need of law
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enforcement to protect exploited children. For example, Facebook's recent
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decision to encrypt its Messenger app, the largest source of reports last
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year about abuse imagery, was hailed by privacy advocates but would make
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it much more difficult for the authorities to catch sexual predators.
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Addressing that broad tension, Matt Wright, a special agent with the
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Department of Homeland Security, said law enforcement and the tech
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industry needed to find "a mutual balance" - "one where companies intended
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to secure data, and protect privacy, don't get in the way of our need to
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have access to critical information intended to safeguard the public,
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investigate crimes and prevent future criminal activity."
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Going Rogue in the Netherlands
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There were other clues about the sites' ability to stay online, in a trail
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of activity across the web that led to the Netherlands. Internet
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criminals come from far and wide to leverage Dutch technology, some of the
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best in the world, for the purposes of spam, malware and viruses. They do
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this by using rogue hosting companies, which are infamously uncooperative
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except in response to legal requests.
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"I realize that because we have such excellent internet logistics, we now
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have it on our plate," said Mr. Grapperhaus, the country's minister of
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justice.
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For child abuse sites like the ones identified as Mr. Chicoine's, a top
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draw has been the company Novogara, formerly known as Ecatel, one of the
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country's most criticized hosting businesses.
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The Chicoine sites were hosted on Novogara's servers for all of 2018 and
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through the early part of this year, records show. While working with the
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company, and without Cloudflare's protections at the time, the sites came
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under increasing pressure from the Canadians. Their hotline, along with at
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least four others around the world, stepped up their offensive, issuing
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hundreds of thousands of more reports about abuse imagery.
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The number was so great, according to the Dutch and Canadian hotlines,
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that Novogara blocked the groups' email addresses to avoid receiving
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additional notices. Ultimately, though, the targeting was effective:
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Novogara pulled the plug on the sites in May.
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Aside from sites like Mr. Chicoine's, the Dutch have an even larger
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problem with sexual predators taking advantage of platforms used to upload
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and share images. Since June, a company that hosts those platforms,
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NFOrce, has appeared in more than half of reports the Dutch hotline has
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received about illegal imagery. Over the past three years, sites using
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NFOrce servers have received more than 100,000 notices of illegal content,
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records show, but the company has not removed the material, according to
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Ms. Gerkens, who leads the hotline.
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NFOrce's sales operations manager, Dave Bakvis, said the company's hands
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were tied by Dutch laws, which prevent it from monitoring customer servers
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without a court order. He said NFOrce acted immediately when it received
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requests from the authorities. Separately, the websites themselves can
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and do remove the content.
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"I hate child pornography," Mr. Bakvis said.
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The Dutch national prosecutor for cybercrimes, Martijn Egberts, said in an
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email that issues involving "sovereignty" and "jurisdiction" complicated
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the removal of illegal material - leading the authorities to cooperate "as
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much as possible" with web hosts to get results.
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Legislation is now being drafted that would require Dutch web hosts to
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keep the material out of their systems, essentially forcing to them to
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scan for it. If a company falls short, it could face ever-increasing
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fines.
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Ben van Mierlo, the national police coordinator for online child sexual
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exploitation, said in an email that companies like Novogara "see
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themselves as a provider of a service." The challenge for the Dutch
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authorities and lawmakers, he said, was to convert them into partners in
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preventing the spread of illegal imagery.
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"There is no space in the Netherlands for those individuals or companies
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that threaten these basic rights for children," Mr. van Mierlo said.
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The Final Assault
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By May of this year, the moderator of the three sites was apoplectic,
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complaining in an email to The Times that "tolerance" for his views was
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coming to a halt.
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Over the next several months, the sites hopscotched around the world,
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finding more than a half-dozen new hosts - to pick up where Novogara left
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off - in Denmark, Russia, the Seychelles and elsewhere. For years, they
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had deployed a similar tactic of changing the last part of their web
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address - moving from .com to .org, for example - to avoid being targeted
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and blocked. Companies and governments that provide these domains often
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do not coordinate with one another, allowing offenders to move around the
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globe while largely preserving their site's identity.
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But there was no hiding this time.
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Records reviewed by The Times show that over seven years, the websites
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were directed to servers in over 20 countries, many of which are shown
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here.
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A borderless internet means bad actors can move their sites between
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countries, and even continents, in seconds.
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This complicates the work of child abuse hotlines and law enforcement
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agencies trying to eradicate images of child sexual abuse.
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The Canadian hotline, working from offices in Winnipeg, Manitoba, were
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using a computer program named Arachnid to crawl the internet in search of
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Mr. Chicoine's sites, and to send takedown notices whenever it identified
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illegal material.
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And as soon as the three sites reappeared somewhere, the Canadians reached
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out to the new hosts. In all, they found more than 18,000 confirmed images
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of abuse on the pages, reporting most of them hundreds of times each. It
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is also possible that law enforcement officials directed their firepower
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at the sites.
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Signy Arnason, the associate executive director of the Canadian center,
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described Arachnid as a "survivor-centric" endeavor, inspired by a survey
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that found victims of child sexual abuse feared being recognized in person
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by those who had viewed their abuse online.
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Since its launch two years ago, Arachnid has found more than 1.6 million
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confirmed images of child sexual abuse, and has sent more than 4.8 million
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takedown notices to websites and hosting providers. The British child
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sexual abuse hotline, the Internet Watch Foundation, has also developed a
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"spider" to crawl the internet. New software drove a surge in takedown
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requests
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Starting in 2013, abuse hotlines around the world sent a trickle of
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requests to remove images on the three sites - with little effect.
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Arachnid automated the detection process, creating a deluge that couldn't
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be ignored.
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"Arachnid is one oar - a big oar - in a ship of many oars rowing against
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this issue," said Denton Howard, executive director of Inhope, the
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organization supporting child abuse hotlines.
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Throughout the battle, the moderator of the sites would email the
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Canadians, accusing them of corruption and filling their inboxes with
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spam. He also contacted Canadian government agencies with false claims
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about the center, and even built software that altered the child sexual
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abuse imagery, hoping to trick Arachnid into skipping it over.
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It was not enough. All imagery of abuse has been removed from the sites,
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and the forums for the predators are closed, at least while their
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opponents have the upper hand.
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But as a parting shot, the home pages were filled with links to other
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sites that offered similar content, giving criminals a road map to
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continue their pursuits - and the groups dedicated to stopping them a list
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of new targets.
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Michael H. Keller contributed reporting from New York.
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Produced by Rich Harris, Virginia Lozano and Rumsey Taylor.
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END
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